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 INTRODUCTION 
Scottish political economists, most notably Adam Smith, undoubtedly played a 
significant role in the development of economics. Adam Smith promoted the idea of 
thinking of the economy as a system, and drew attention to many of the questions 
which have exercised economists’ minds ever since: questions of value and 
distribution, questions of economic growth, trade, taxation and money. But Adam 
Smith was by no means alone: other Scottish figures who made significant 
contributions in their own right, as well as influencing, sparring with, or being 
influenced by, Smith included Anderson, Carmichael, Chalmers, Ferguson, Hume, 
Hutcheson, Lauderdale, Rae, Reid, Steuart and Stewart.  
 It has been argued, for example by Macfie (1955), Campbell (1976), Dow 
(1987) and Mair (1990, Introduction) that, rather than considering each of these 
figures only individually, and subject to diverse influences, there is a commonality 
between them which justifies considering them as part of a Scottish tradition. To do so 
raises further questions, as to the nature of the tradition in relation to other traditions, 
and as to the longevity of the tradition. All of Macfie, Dow and Mair see the tradition 
extending long past the period of the Enlightenment, and discuss the Scottish tradition 
in relation to modern economics.  
 The purpose of this article is to reconsider the question of the nature and 
existence of a Scottish tradition in political economy, in relation to modern 
economics. The discussion will draw on recent developments in economic 
methodology which offer insights not available to the earlier literature on the Scottish 
political economy tradition and whihc offer a new perspective on the significance of 
the Scottish approach.  
 First we focus on the notion of tradition itself, in an attempt to clarify its 
meaning in relation to alternative concepts such as schools and paradigms. By 
specifying the nature of tradition more explicitly than in the earlier literature, the 
foundation is provided for the specification of the nature of the Scottish political 
economy tradition in the following section. Tradition is understood as referring to an 
approach to theorising and the relationship between theory and reality, rather than the 
content of theory as such. It is therefore not surprising that Scottish political economy 
should have inspired diverse theoretical developments. Those developments which 
can be seen as a continuation of the Scottish tradition differ in terms of theoretical 
content, but not in underlying approach to theorising; they all come under the 
umbrella of ‘political economy’.  
 Finally we reconsider the concept of tradition, and the Scottish tradition in 
particular, in the light of recent developments in methodology. In particular, there 
have been two significant developments each of which can be seen to have roots in the 
Scottish tradition, and can in turn illuminate our understanding of the nature of the 
tradition: the hermeneutic/rhetoric approach, and the critical realist approach. There is 
currently debate as to whether these two approaches are mutually exclusive. By 
considering them together in the context of the Scottish political economy tradition, 
we can understand the Scottish tradition as an exemplar of a complementarity between 
the two approaches. This suggests that a reconsideration of the Scottish tradition in 
this light may show one possible, constructive, way forward for modern economics. 
 
 
 
THE CONCEPT OF TRADITION 
First we need to address the question of what is meant by the term ‘tradition’ (see 
further Dow et al, 1997). Tradition connotes a passing down from one generation to 
another. A tradition is thus something which can be identified over a long period of 
time (defined as extending over generations). A tradition is thus distinguished from a 
school of thought, which normally refers to a set of contemporaries. Skinner (1965) 
identifies a Scottish historical school within a specific community of scholars in 
Scotland in the eighteenth century (see also Brown, 1988 and Hutchison, 1988). This 
school is identified by ‘a distinct theory of history ... remarkable for its formality and 
for the clear and unequivocable link which was established between economic and 
social organisation’ (Skinner, 1965, 1-2). By considering a Scottish political economy 
tradition, we are positing a commonality which extended well beyond the eighteenth 
century. 
 The concept of tradition refers to a commonality of customs, thought and 
practices. In other words, it extends beyond specific theories to encompass what we 
might call an ‘approach’ to the subject matter. This conception of tradition as 
approach was evident in Macfie’s (1955) reference to the Scottish ‘approach and 
method’, Gray’s (1976) reference to the tradition in terms of the ‘role of knowledge in 
society, and the role of morality’, and Skinner’s (1992, p.236) reference to a ‘common 
style of approach’ among Smith and his predecessors. What is being suggested, then, 
is that the Scottish tradition encapsulated a specific view of scientific knowledge, its 
relation to reality and its role in society which generated a particular approach to 
economics. The eighteenth century Scottish historical school was then a part of that 
tradition, as expressed by a particular group of individuals at that time. Implicit, then, 
is the notion that there was something distinctive about Scottish Enlightenment 
philosophy which generated a distinctive approach to economics. This notion of 
distinctiveness is explored in Campbell and Skinner (1982). But we argue further that 
this approach was embodied in a tradition which extended well beyond the eighteenth 
century. 
 Kuhn’s concept of paradigm has been brought to bear in earlier discussions of 
Scottish political economy (see O’Brien, 1976 and Dow, 1987). Kuhn’s (1974) notion 
of paradigm as extending from Weltanschauung, or world-view, to disciplinary 
matrix, or theoretical tools, captures the importance of philosophical underpinnings. 
His emphasis on the role of scientific communities also captures the importance of the 
social structure of science. In this spirit, Tribe (1988, 3 n.6) suggests that tradition 
involves ‘not simply theoretical, practical and descriptive principles, but the role and 
organisation of teaching...the application of economic knowledge and the 
establishment of professional and academic associations.’  Also paradigms, unlike 
schools, are often understood to persist over several generations.  
 The similarity between tradition and paradigm is most strong at the 
epistemological level, ie both entail a similar view of the growth of scientific 
knowledge within scientific communities, underpinned by a shared philosophical 
view. But paradigms also tend to be identified at the ontological level, with each 
paradigm entailing a distinctive, shared world-view. As we shall see in the following 
section, the Scottish political economy tradition has spawned quite distinctive 
developments which we would associate with quite different paradigms. Indeed 
O’Brien (1976) explicitly considers whether Smith’s influence on economics should 
be understood paradigmatically. By focusing on the continuities, as well as 
discontinuities in Classical thought, he concludes that Kuhn’s vision of distinct 
paradigms being overthrown by scientific revolutions does not fit very well. But there 
has been a specific range of developments emanating from eighteenth-century Scottish 
political economy which share a view of how to generate knowledge and how to 
regard that knowledge, in relation to reality, ie they share a common approach to 
economics, and can thus be seen to belong in the same, Scottish political economy, 
tradition. These developments can be categorised as political economy, to distinguish 
them from modern mainstream economics, which adopts a different approach (see 
Dow, 1990). While it can be debated how far the shift from the political economy 
approach to the approach of modern mainstream economics was revolutionary, the 
two approaches do conform to the incommensurability of the Kuhnian framework. But 
the political economy approach has within its various strands sufficient 
incommensurability to allow us to identify a range of paradigms. The tradition concept 
is thus broader than the pradigm concept. 
 O’Brien (1976) also argues against understanding the legacy of Smith in 
Popperian terms as a gradual accretion of knowledge, built on the falsification of 
propositions. Popper (1974) also had a conception of tradition which emphasised its 
sociological foundation in ‘discourse communities’. Yet he saw tradition in 
methodological-individualist terms (ie it was to be understood in terms of individuals) 
and also saw it as internally-generated. The view of tradition adopted here (which is in 
fact consistent with the particular epistemology of the Scottish political economy 
tradition) is that traditions are the product of the wider intellectual, cultural and social 
environment. It is this which justifies the starting-point of considering a tradition 
particular to a (Scottish) society, even though we can identify its influence on thought 
in other societies. Thus we can see the origins of the Scottish political economy 
tradition, for example, in the education system, with its early emphasis on the 
historical and the philosophical. Just as a tradition has consequences in the future 
evolution of institutions, it can also be seen as arising from a particular set of 
institutions. We can then understand the persistence of a tradition in the persistence of 
the environment which originally spawned it. 
 This discussion of tradition is in danger of becoming circular, stemming as it 
does from the Scottish political economy approach and its underlying theory of 
knowledge. We therefore turn in the next section to considering the nature of the 
Scottish political economy tradition directly.  
 
THE NATURE OF THE SCOTTISH POLITICAL ECONOMY TRADITION 
Since we have suggested that traditions in economic thought are a product of their 
environment, we need to consider the nature of the environment which spawned the 
Scottish political economy tradition. The intellectual environment was that of the 
Scottish Enlightenment. While other Enlightenments are often presented as being 
‘rationalist’, that was not the case for the Scottish Enlightenment. Certainly there was 
the same reaction against clerical dogmatism as elsewhere, and the same drive to build 
science on reason. But the status of scientific knowledge was distinctive in Scotland. 
Hume’s (1964) scepticism was a relatively extreme expression of an epistemology 
which recognised that, while science might uncover truth, the problem of induction 
meant that there was no assurance that truth could be known to have been identified. 
There was a range of possible scientific accounts of real phenomena. Further, 
scientific accounts should be particular to context although the aim is to identify 
general principles. 
 This recognition, and thus tolerance, of the co-existence of alternative 
viewpoints may be seen as the outcome, among other things, of Scotland’s political 
position vis-a-vis England (see Phillipson, 1975). Particularly following the union of 
1707, there were frequent episodes in which differences between Scottish and English 
opinion were evident. For Scotland, there was no denying the reality of alternative 
perspectives. For England, the dominant neighbour, however, these disputes were 
marginal to normal existence and the acknowledgement of alternative veiwpoints was 
thus not a central feature of life. 
 The open, tolerant system of thought which thus emerged in the Enlightenment 
was in turn reinforced by the system of higher education in Scotland. (See Davie, 
1961 and Cant, 1982. The importance of education system was also emphasised by 
Macfie, 1955.) Higher education started, at a relatively early age, with instruction in 
logic and moral philosophy. This early training influenced the way in which other 
disciplines were taught, so that they too took a philosphical approach. Mathematics, 
for example, was taught by means of historical accounts of the development of 
different mathematical systems, implying that choice of mathematical system was 
context-specific. This facilitated inventive applications of theory to practical 
problems, an orientation encouraged further by the emphasis on the Romans in 
classical education, rather than the Greeks. 
 The education system was the institutional arrangement in Scotland which 
most directly influenced the approach taken to knowledge, and its relation to reality. 
But other institutional arrangements and their underlying philosophies likewise 
promoted this particular scientific approach. The Church of Scotland and its approach 
to religious knowledge and practice (see Rothbard, 1995) the Scottish legal system 
and the principles of jurisprudence (see Smith,   ) and the cooperative Scottish system 
of public affairs (see Chalmers,     ) all contributed to open-system ways of thinking, 
combining convention and contingency with first principles. 
 Political economy emerged as a practical application of moral philosophy in 
Carmichael lectures at Glasgow, and then Hutcheson’s, which Smith attended. Smith 
himself contributed to the articulation of the Scottish Enlightenment view of science 
in the History of Astronomy (Smith, 1778), where he discussed the motivation for 
science in psychological terms. This was reinforced by his Lectures on Rhetoric and 
Belles Lettres (1983), where he analysed the nature of scientific discourse. Here he 
explicitly drew attention to theories which were rhetorically succesful, where success 
in persuasion was not necessarily an indicator of closeness to the truth: 
It gives great pleasure to see the phaenomena which we reckoned the most 
unaccountable as deduced from some principle (commonly a wellknown one) 
and all united in one chain....We need not be surprised then that the Cartesian 
Philosophy .... tho it does not perhaps contain a word truth ... should 
nevertheless have been so universally received by all the Learned in Europe at 
the time.  (Smith, 1783; 1983, p. 146) 
 Because political economy emerged as a practical application of moral 
philosophy, the starting-point for analysis was practical questions whose analysis 
required detailed understanding of the nature of the subject-matter. Thus, while 
Hume’s scepticism had drawn attention to the problem of induction, nevertheless 
observation was inevitably a central part of any economic analysis. From this 
observation, general principles could be derived which could then be applied to other 
questions. Thus Smith’s observations of the social aspect of human nature led him to 
expound his principle of sympathy in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith, 1759) 
while his observation of economic processes led him to expound the principle of the 
division of labour in the Wealth of Nations (Smith, 1776).  
 Finally, the view of science which developed under the influence of Hume was 
that study of human nature should be central, where human nature was understood 
primarily in terms of ‘passions’, with reason secondary. Thus, just as political 
economy emerged as a practical application of moral philosophy, so did the other 
social sciences. Therefore, not only was political economy understood in terms of 
philosophy and history, but also it was not seen as separable from the other emerging 
social sciences. It was natural therefore for political economy to develop in what we 
would now see as an interdisciplinary environment.  
 Indeed the open system of thought encouraged by the epistemology of the 
Scottish Enlightenment itself encouraged each discipline to develop as an open system 
of thought. What we mean by an open system is one whose boundaries are not 
predetermined. Further, the nature and range of its constituent variables and the 
structure of their interrelationships are not predetermined. This followed from the 
starting point of human nature, understood in terms of passions and sentiments of 
individuals as social beings. It also followed from the historical approach which 
required ‘the need to adapt to changed circumstances, while suggesting that the 
processes of history could not be reversed’ (Campbell and Skinner, 1982, p.2). 
 The features of the Scottish political economy tradition were summarised in 
Dow (1987) as follows: 
 an acceptance of the limitations of theory 
 a recognition of the sociological and psychological aspects of theory 
appraisal 
 a concern with practical issues 
 a consequent preference for breadth of understanding of the background to 
these issues, over depth of isolated aspects 
 a preference for drawing on several disciplines in an integrated manner to 
provide that depth 
 a preference for arguing from first principles 
 a preference for approaching a subject’s first principles by discussing their 
contextual development 
 a specification of first principles in terms of a non-individualistic 
representation of human nature, with a consequent emphasis on 
conventional behaviour. 
All of these features of the Scottish political economy tradition refer to approach 
rather than content. The tradition could thus encompass a range of distinctive views 
and theories, with explicit differences between Smith and Steuart, for example (see 
Skinner, 1981) or by Rae with respect to Smith (see Dow et al., forthcoming).  
 One way of attempting to establish the identity of the Scottish tradition would 
be to demonstrate the commonality of approach among those identified with the 
Scottish tradition in spite of, in many cases marked, theoretical differences. In the 
various accounts which have focused on the existence of a Scottish tradition, the 
emphasis has been on approach, variously categorised as ‘philosophical, sociological’ 
(Macfie, 1955), ‘historical’ (Hutchison, 1988) and ‘holistic’ (Gray, 1988).  Mair 
(1990) gathered together essays on a range of figures in the Scottish tradition (such as 
Hume, Smith, Steuart and Rae) often characterised for their distinciveness, in order to 
demonstrate their commonality. 
 Here we choose an alternative means of elucidation by considering a range of 
developments in economic thought which draw influence from Smith and/or the 
Scottish tradition. It is hard in fact to find any body of economic thought which does 
not express some debt to Smith. If the argument is to have content, that there is an 
approach to economics which can still be identified with the Scottish tradition, we 
must distinguish between those developments which carry forward the Scottish 
political economy approach and those which do not. In other words, some 
developments can be seen as carrying forward some of the content of Smith’s work (in 
the form of questions or theories, interpreted according to a different approach) but 
not his approach. 
 Of the various modern schools of thought in economics, we can identify 
several which share what we may call the ‘political economy’ approach (see Dow, 
1990): neo-Austrian economics, some Marxian economics, Institutionalist economics 
and Post Keynesian economics. While each has a different vision of real processes, 
there is a shared theory of knowledge in the sense that each is concerned to understand 
real processes. Since these processes are not deterministic, but rather entail crucial 
elements of creativity and/or evolution, reality is seen as an open system. Certain 
knowledge of these processes, therefore, is not feasible. Theory therefore itself 
develops as an open system, with reference to context, and embracing other 
disciplines. Theory refers to first principles which derive from the vision of real 
processes held by each paradigm. 
 The influence of Smith and the Scottish tradition on each of the political 
economy paradigms is well documented. The influence on Marx and Marxian 
economics is evident, for example, in Heilbroner’s (1986) interpretation of Smith. The 
influence on Institutionalist economics is explained in Sobel (1987). Dow (1991) 
explains the consistency between the Scottish approach and Post Keynesian 
economics. 
 Here we will focus on neo-Austrian economics for our consideration of the 
influence of the Scottish tradition on political economy. We will then compare this 
influence with that on modern mainstream economics. It will be argued that the 
former carries forward the Scottish political economy approach, while the latter does 
not. 
 Let us consider first the view taken of Smith and Scottish political economy by 
the neo-Austrians. Hayek always made explicit the considerable extent to which he 
had been influenced by Ferguson, Smith and Hume in particular. Gray (1988) 
specifically draws attention to Hayek’s recognition of the difference between the 
Scottish Enlightenment and the French Enlightenment, where the former emphasised 
the limitations to human understanding, while the latter was rationalist in the 
conventional sense of the term. The debt to the Scottish tradition was thus primarily at 
the level of approach to knowledge about the economy, knowledge being in turn 
central to the content of Hayek’s theory. Further, Gray draws attention to the openness 
to other disciplines entailed in a view of individuals as social beings which Hayek 
carried forward from the Scottish tradition. Thus, for all neo-Austrians are associated 
with methodological individualism, the individual is viewed in social terms, acting 
within a particular institutional environment. 
 This thesis, that neo-Austrian economics follows in the Scottish political 
economy tradition, might seem to be belied by Rothbard’s (1995) account of the 
history of thought from an Austrian perspective. Here he castigates Smith for setting 
economics on the path which led away from the foundations of the neo-Austrian 
approach, which Rothbard identifies as having been laid by Smith’s predecessors: 
As a result, the Austrians and their nineteenth century predecessors, largely 
deprived of knowledge of the pre-Smith tradition, were in many ways forced to 
reinvent the wheel, to painfully claw their way back to the knowledge that 
many pre-Smithians had enjoyed long before. (Rothbard, 1995, p.502) 
Thus Rothbard argues that neo-Austrian economics is consistent with the Scottish 
political economy approach, but precludes Smith from that approach.  
 Rothbard’s approach to the history of thought is itself an example of the 
application of the Scottish political economy approach. He emphasises the possibility 
of economic thought taking wrong turnings, with Smith as his prime example, 
explicitly pointing out the importance of the Kuhnian notion of incommensurability, 
and the non-accretionaist view of the development of thought. More generally, he 
emphasises context as being significant for the development of thought, referring to: 
.... my growing conviction that leaving out religious outlook, as well as social 
and political philosophy, would disastrously skew any picture of the history of 
economic thought.  (Rothbard, 1995, p.xiii) 
 Rothbard’s objections to Smith focus primarily on content (such as the labour 
theory of value) rather than approach, and thus need not concern us here. Where he 
does refer to approach, it is not clear that his interpretation of Smith is altogether 
apposite. Rothbard castigates Smith for his treatment of the laissez-faire argument by 
pointing to what we would identify as Smith’s consistency with the Scottish tradition. 
Rothbard (1995, pp. 465-466) correctly, in our view, defends Smith against the charge 
of applying an a priori concept, the Invisible Hand; this concept rather was the result 
of the study of actual market processes. But he proceeds to castigate Smith for 
enumerating exceptions to the laissez-faire principle, in spite of the fact that context-
specific analysis (which inevitably colours the application of general principles) is 
another hallmark of the Scottish tradition. 
 The other aspect of Rothbard’s critique of Smith in terms of approach is 
central to the question of Smith’s subsequent influence on the direction taken by 
economics. Rothbard associates Smith with a focus on long-run equilibrium. He 
identifies the problem with Smith’s monetary theory and value theory with: 
Smith’s shift of concentration from the real world of market prices to the 
exclusive vision of long-run ‘natural’ equilibrium. The shift from the real 
world of market process to focusing on equilibrium states made Smith 
impatient with the process analysis which was the hallmark and the merit of 
the price-specie-flow approach. (Rothbard, 1995, p.461) 
Rothbard is identifying here what he sees as a move away from what we have 
characterised as the Scottish political economy approach, with its emphasis on 
process. Rothbards interpretation cuts across those interpretations of Smith as 
promoting the Scottish political economy approach with its emphasis on historical 
process. Skinner (1979) and Groenewegen (1982), for example, argue that Smith was 
fully conscious of the incompatitibility between general equilibrium analysis and the 
history approach which he employed, in the Scottish tradition. (See also Dow and 
Dow, forthcoming, for this argument addressed specifically to Rothbard’s 
interpretation.) 
 But Rothbard’s argument about the influence of Smith’s work on the 
subsequent development of economics has substance, to the extent that others have 
similarly interpreted Smith in general equilibrium terms. Blaug (1964, pp. 41-44) and 
Hollander (1973, chapter 4), for example, have promoted the view that Smith was the 
inspiration for general equilibrium theory. Indeed Arrow and Hahn introduce their 
seminal account of that theory with reference to Smith: 
Smith ...perceived the most important implicaiton of general equilibrium 
theory, the ability of a competitive system to achieve an allocation of resources 
that is efficient in some sense. Nothing resembling a rigourous argument for, 
or even a careful statement of the efficiency proposition can be found in Smith, 
however. (Arrow and Hahn, 1971, p.2)  
 Winch (forthcoming) has detailed the senses in which general equilibrium 
theorists have misinterpreted Smith, as a result of reading Smith from a modern 
general equilibrium perspective. This perspective is based on a closed-system, 
formalist approach to theory as having universal application. As a closed system 
approach, it is not open to other disciplines. As a formalist system, it has an internalist 
claim to truth. The rationalist view of human nature it embodies depicts individuals as 
independent, atomistic agents for whom rationality supercedes passions. It takes 
inspiration from the rationalist French Enlightenment, which Hayek had distinguished 
from the Scottish Enlightenment in the delineation of the Austrian approach. Smith 
himself (as evidenced by the quotation on page?? above) noted the Cartesian approach 
for its persuasiveness rather than its closeness to truth. 
 To say that modern political economy paradigms thus represent a continuation 
of the Scottish tradition is to say more than that modern economics can all be traced 
back to prior influences. General equilibrium theory is sometimes expressed as a 
continuation from Smithian economics. But it is a continuation in the sense that 
questions Smith posed in terms of the Scottish political economy approach have been 
posed again within the quite different approach of general equilibrium theory, which 
can be identified more closely with the rationalist approach. In other words we are 
distinguishing here between content, in the form of questions and theories, and 
approach, and identifying the Scottish tradition with the latter. Further, the way in 
which questions and theories are understood is coloured fundamentally by approach, 
which contributes to such different interpretations of Smith.  
 Questions of interpretation and approach to theorising are now at the forefront 
of discussions within philosophy of science as applied to economics. The Scottish 
approach itself represents a particular stance on the generation of knowledge, its 
diffusion through persuasion and its relation to the real world. Again the discussion is 
in danger of becoming circular in that the continuation of the Scottish tradition is 
being discussed here on the basis of the theory of knowledge and its relation to the 
real world embodied by the Scottish tradition. We therefore turn in the next section to 
consider explicitly the content of the Scottish approach in the context of modern 
discussions about knowledge, persuasion and reality. 
 
 
SCOTTISH POLITICAL ECONOMY AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY OF 
ECONOMICS 
There is a limit to the usefulness of considering the Scottish political economy 
tradition as a set of theories in the context of modern economies. But a consideration 
of the Scottish political economy tradition as an approach to economics is potentially 
of considerable interest as an exemplar for modern economics. As an approach which 
emphasised the significance of historical context, it is particularly apposite for 
translation into the modern context. Further, this approach explicitly addresses some 
of the issues raised in recent developments in the methodology of economics. 
 Modern economics can be characterised by a range of schools of thought 
which are differentiated by their methodology. We consider here the argument that the 
Scottish tradition is still evident in the analysis of the philosophical underpinnings of 
theory which has developed alongside the development of particular paradigms which 
fall into the category of political economy. One notable characteristic of political 
economy in its different forms is a philosophical awareness which is not generally 
characteristic of mainstream economics. This awareness may be explained at least in 
part by the need to understand and articulate methodological differences from the 
mainstream. But it has also been necessitated by the need to legitimise the whole 
notion of alternatives. Mainstream economics is built on the accretion-of-knowledge 
view sustained first by the deductivism of Ricardo and then its empirical counterpart 
in logical positivism. Economic theorising, then, as well as economic theory, is 
viewed as a closed system.  
 It was therefore not surprising that non-mainstream economists should be 
attracted to the ideas of Kuhn, which supported the legitimacy of competing, 
incommensurate paradigms. The common elements between Kuhn and Smith were 
highlighted by Skinner (1979). Smith (1778) had argued in the History of Astronomy 
that science was a human (and thus social) activity motivated by psychological needs. 
Because of the problem of induction, no one theory could lay claim to truth; which 
theory succeeded depended on the correspondence between theory and observed 
reality, but seen through a socio-psychological filter. Smith too, therefore, had a view 
of science as non-accretionist, but evolving according to complex socio-psychological 
principles within an open system of knowledge. The Scottish political economy 
tradition, which embodied this view of science, therefore anticipated Kuhn. This could 
now be said to be part of the conventional wisdom in Smithian studies. 
 But discussion in philosophy of science, and in the methodology of economics, 
has gone beyond Kuhn. In particular, it has developed along two strands: 
constructivism and realism. It might therefore be argued that modern discussion has 
moved beyond any contribution which the Scottish political economy tradition might 
make. On the contrary, it will be argued here that the Scottish tradition in fact 
anticipated both of these strands. Modern discussion is at the stage of tentative moves 
in the direction of reconciling these two strands in a synthesis which combines 
constructivism and realism. The Scottish political economy tradition in fact offers an 
exemplar of such a synthesis. This is controversial in that each strand sees its own 
approach as a progression from what has gone before in economic thought. 
 The first strand, termed constructivism (see Backhouse, 1992) can be 
understood as a logical extension of Kuhn’s approach (mis)understood in dualist 
terms (see Dow, 1997a). Hume’s efforts to provide a foundation for science in spite of 
his awareness of the problem of induction have been widely (mis)understood as out-
and-out scepticism (see Fitzgibbons, 1995, Appendix 1). Similarly, Kuhn’s efforts to 
demonstrate how science actually proceeds in the absence of universal appraisal 
criteria were (mis)understood as out-and-out-relativism (see Blaug, 1980). Those who 
adopted this awareness of the contextuality of knowledge, and the dangers of universal 
criteria for appraisal, but who did so from a dualistic perspective, espoused the dual of 
traditional, prescriptive methodology, which was no methodology at all. 
 Constructivism has two main strands: the rhetoric/hermeneutic approach and 
the postmodernist approach. The former, whose leader is McCloskey (1986, 1994), 
focuses on the rhetorical devices by which economists actually persuade, as opposed 
to what is presented as the demonstrative logic of the official methodology. In many 
ways, we can see this approach as being aniticipated by Smith (1723 - 1790). Smith 
too saw the communication of scientific ideas as an exercise in persuasion, and 
constructed a detailed analysis of different categories of rhetoric and techniques of 
persuasion. His references to the persuasiveness of Descartes’s system presage 
modern discussion of the persuasiveness of the official discourse of mainstream 
economics as a closed, axiomatic, formal system.  
 The modern rhetoric approach allows for the possibility of the general 
acceptance of particular theories, but as the result of rhetorical persuasion rather than 
demonstrative logic. Much of modern methodology now consists of descriptive 
analysis of theoretical developments along these lines (see Dow, 1997a). 
Postmodernists go further in denying the feasibility of general theories, in that the 
fragmentation of knowledge (and, implicitly, of nature) precludes anything but the 
most particular of statements to be made, while even these may be understood 
differently by different economists (see for example Amariglio, 1990). There is 
something in common here between the postmodern approach and the historical 
approach of the Scottish tradition, with its emphasis on particularity of context and of 
understanding, and the irreversibility of history. 
 Constructivism is presented as a position on theory of knowledge, without 
reference to reality. Constructivism denies the possibility of statements about reality, 
given the particularity of any one economist’s knowledge. Indeed this is the object of 
criticism of much of economics emanating from the critical realist approach (see 
Lawson, 1997), which is the second major strand in modern thinking on economic 
methodology which we consider here. For our purposes it is notable too that the 
constructivist over-emphasis on theory of knowledge is seen by critical realists as 
stemming from Hume and the Scottish Enlightenment (see Bhaskar, 1975, 
Introduction). The critical realist approach requires that analysis start with statements 
about reality. It would then follow that economics would focus on underlying 
economic processes rather than surface ‘events’. Critical realism has been identified 
by some political economists as providing a satisfactory account of the political 
economy approach (see for example Arestis, 1990, and Lavoie, 1990).  
 The critical realist approach can be seen to have elements in common with the 
Scottish political eocnomy tradition. Smith’s search for first principles on the basis of 
detailed historical analysis within an open theoretical system, taking account of the 
possibility of causal processes interweaving in a way which precluded analysis by 
means of a closed, formal system, would seem consistent with critical realist 
methodology. 
 But it would at first sight appear contradictory to identify both the 
constructivist and critical realist approaches with the Scottish political economy 
tradition.  How could one tradition encompass both a denial of ontology and a belief 
in the centrality of ontology? The problem of incompatibility can in fact be seen as yet 
another manifestation of dualism, which drives thought into positions defined in 
mututally-exclusive, all-encompassing categories (see Dow, 1990a). Since the 
Scottish political economy tradition is based on open-system theorising, it is non-
dualist, and this type of categorisation is inappropriate. 
 In fact the critical realist approach already embodies elements of 
constructivism in that the economic process, theory and knowledge in general are all 
understood as open systems. There is no necessary expectation that two realist 
analyses will identify the same underlying causal processes. Indeed it is central to the 
approach that any context will involve a range of causal processes operating 
simultaneously. Not only is a range of methods required to build up an understanding 
of particular causal processes, but different economists might well focus on different 
causal processes for their enquiries.  
 There have been moves to demonstrate that there is a significant middle 
ground between constructivism and critical realism. First, Maki (1988) argued that the 
rhetoric approach employed a type of realism with respect to the object of discourse, 
ie it was an analysis of actual processes of persuasion. Second, it was argued that the 
way forward for the rhetoric approach is to acknowledge the role of criticism in 
analysis of rhetoric (see Stettler, 1995) and that the way forward for the postmodern 
approach is to acknowledge the role of an understanding of real causal mechanisms in 
analysing human agency (see Sofianou, 1995). Without such developments, the 
constructivist approach lacked a logical foundation (see Dow, 1997b). But with such 
developments understood as a dialectic, there was scope for the emergence of a 
synthesis (from the thesis of positivism and the antithesis of postmodernism) which 
would take economics forward (see Dow, 1997a). And indeed, now postmodern 
writers are seen to have moved in that direction (see Park, forthcoming). 
 But rather than looking forward speculatively to a possible future synthesis, 
the Scottish political economy tradition can be studied as an exemplar for such a 
synthesis. The tradition provides the basis for the constructivist approach in a theory 
of knowledge understood in historical, social and generally context-specific terms. 
Like constructivism, the Scottish approach did not presume that it was feasible to 
identify absolute truth. All scientists can do is attempt to establish principles and 
persuade others that these are good principles. 
 But how these principles are established, and what is persuasive, are intimately 
tied up with reality. Smith argued that science progresses by the scientist’s attempt to 
reduce the psychological discomfort caused by observations which do not accord with 
current principles. What is persuasive, in turn, is what accords with what is already 
held to be known, according to common sense principles. For natural scientists, 
dealing with issues not of everyday concern, it is possible for principles to be 
developed independently of common sense. But for the social sciences, which deal in 
moral issues in which the general populace does have a day-to-day concern, there is 
less scope for deviation from what that populace has already concluded on the basis of 
experience (see        ). Hume’s argument was for science not to be so constrained by 
common sense understanding as to prevent it from exploring underlying causal 
mechanisms. But there was no suggestion that this exploration should be divorced 
from experience.  
 In other words, the scottish tradition also springs from a view of the relation 
between science and reality which has far more in common with critical realism than 
modern critical realists acknowledge. An inspection of any of the main texts of the 
Scottish political economy tradition would reinforce this interpretation. The 
characteristics identified by the many studies of these texts note the focus on policy 
issues, the detailed grounding in observation, and the search for first principles 
representing the underlying causal processes, all expressed with the consciousness that 
economics could not be expected to encompass these principles in a closed, formal 
system. Even Smith, the greatest of the systematisers, presented his system as an open 
system (see Skinner, 1979). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
CONCLUSION 
We have attempted here to refine further the notion of a Scottish tradition in political 
economy. We have emphasised an interpretation of that system in terms of approach 
to theorising and its relation with reality. This allows for the fact that there were 
significant differences in theoretical content, even in the eighteenth century. We have 
argued further that the Scottish tradition extends well beyond the eighteenth century, 
noting the legacy of the Scottish tradition in a wide range of theoretical developments 
which come under the umbrella category of political economy. Indeed it is the 
political economy approach itself which shows the commonality with the Scottish 
tradition. 
 We have emphasised further the significance of the Scottish tradition also for 
the methodological analysis of modern economics. This analysis is currently 
developing along the two strands of constructivism and critical realism. Both of these 
strands are shown to have elements in common with the Scottish tradition. There are 
currenly efforts to take these two strands forward synthetically. It is argued here that 
the Scottish political economy tradition itself encompasses just such a synthesis. By 
further study of the nature of this synthesis, we may better see the way forward for 
modern economics.  
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